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Preserving the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: Here and Abroad
Robert J. Anello*
The corporate attorney-client privilege, well developed in our
jurisprudence, may be an endangered species, under attack on a number
of fronts. Despite having been firmly established by the United States
Supreme Court in its opinion in Upjohn v. United States,1 the Department
of Justice ("DOJ") and regulators have tried to make assertion of the
attorney-client privilege by investigated companies painful.2
Commentators similarly continue to criticize application of the privilege
to corporate entities. Finally, internationally many countries do not
provide an equal degree of protection to corporate attorney-client
communications, particularly when the "attorney" is a company's in-
house counsel. This lack of observance of the privilege by certain
countries may undermine effective use of the privilege by companies
involved in cross-border investigations.
This article examines the dynamics of the corporate attorney-client
privilege and corporate liability in the United States and abroad, and the
various factors that have served to weaken the privilege. The article also
details the evolving law relevant to the assertion and protection of that
privilege in multi-national investigation. Despite the lack of support, the
corporate attorney-client privilege-especially in a legal system that so
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area of ethics, white collar criminal law, and trial tactics. He is the past chair of the
Committee on Professional Responsibility for the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York and was named as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee Task Force on the
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1. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
2. See generally id.
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readily exposes corporate entities to their own criminal and regulatory
jeopardy-is a creature whose existence should be preserved.
I. CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
The corporate attorney-client privilege is well-developed in
American law. The Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Upjohn, provided
an expansive view of the privilege as it applied to communications
between a company's attorneys and its employees.3 Since Upjohn,
investigating attorneys representing corporate clients have developed an
almost ritualized approach to gathering information by interviewing
corporate employees in order to ensure that the attorney's corporate
client is able to control the confidentiality of those communications.
This process-which includes informing the corporate employee that the
attorney works for the company and not for the employee; alerting the
employee to the obligation to maintain confidentiality; and explaining
that only the corporation can decide when and to whom to disclose the
information-has become so well-entrenched and routine in the legal
community and is generally assumed to satisfy the legal standards
necessary for the corporation to rely on the attorney-client privilege.4
Equally well-established in this country is the notion that work done
by in-house counsel is as deserving of confidentiality protection as the
work of outside counsel. Although American law draws no distinction
between in-house counsel for a corporation and outside counsel for
privilege purposes, complications may arise where in-house lawyers are
called on to give "business advice," which is not covered by the attorney-
client privilege. In these situations, courts have expressed concern that
companies will funnel information through in-house lawyers in order to
shield them from disclosure. 5 Accordingly, in examining whether a
particular communication with an in-house lawyer is privileged, the
courts ask whether (i) the task could be handled by a non-lawyer;
(ii) counsel was contacted for legal purposes; (iii) counsel holds another
office in the corporation; (iv) the discussion relates to laws or anticipated
litigation; and (v) the issue of privilege was discussed.6 With this caveat,
however, under United States law, in-house lawyers are treated the same
as outside lawyers with respect to the attorney-client privilege and the
3. See generally id.
4. See Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Beyond 'Upjohn': Necessary
Warnings in Internal Investigations, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 2005.
5. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Manufacturing Corp., 1996 WL
29392, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
6. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 10:5 (2007).
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corporation may assert the privilege with respect to communications
involving in-house and outside counsel.7
II. ASSAULTS ON THE PRIVILEGE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
For many years, the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege and its
application to corporate America seemed beyond question. Within the
past decade, however, federal prosecutors, among others, have mounted
a multi-pronged assault against the privilege, especially in the context of
corporate America. 8 The assault began with the DOJ's first iteration of
guidelines concerning the prosecution of corporations. The
government's policy in this regard initially was first set forth in the
Holder Memorandum, captioned "Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations," issued in 1999 by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder Jr.9 The Holder Memorandum was supplanted in 2003 by the
Thompson Memorandum, more formally known as "Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations," authored by then-
Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson. 10 The guidelines were
created to guide DOJ prosecutors in making the decision whether to seek
charges against a business organization."'
In essence, both the Holder and Thompson Memoranda encouraged
federal prosecutors to seek waivers by corporations of their attorney-
client privilege in a sort of quid-pro-quo for favorable treatment by the
prosecutor in considering whether to indict the corporation.12
Prosecutors then use a corporation's refusal to provide privilege waivers
as an aggravating factor in favor of charging a corporation with a
7. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392-97.
8. Robert J. Anello, Justice Under Attack: The Federal Government's Assault on
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 1 CARDOZO PuB. L., POL'Y & ETHics J. 1, 5 (2003).
Ironically, in the United States, the assault on privilege is from the very lawyers who
have been deemed guardians of the privilege. Id. For instance, in the wake of September
11 th, and the subsequent passage of the PATRIOT ACT, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
published a regulation allowing the Attorney General to unilaterally monitor the
conversation of detainees, including witnesses or suspects, based on nothing more than
"reasonable suspicion" of terrorism or "acts of violence." See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)
(2001). These rules were enacted without judicial input or oversight and essentially made
it impossible for these individuals to hold a privileged conversation with counsel. See id.
9. Memorandum from Eric Holder Jr., Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys on Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corporations (June 16, 1999).
10. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003).
11. Id.
12. Id; Memorandum from Eric Holder Jr., supra note 9.
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crime. 13 The Thompson Memorandum also focused on a corporation's
relationship with its employees during a government investigation,
considering whether the business organization agreed to pay its
employee's attorneys' fees, shared information with the employee and
his counsel outside the context of common interest agreements, or
sanctioned the Fifth Amendment assertions of its employees.14 The
DOJ's "Principles" were effective in coercing many companies to waive
the privilege in order to obtain favorable treatment.
Not surprisingly, other regulatory agencies, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), soon followed suit in using waiver
of the corporate attorney-client privilege as a proxy for full cooperation.
For example, in October 2001, the SEC issued a report outlining some of
the criteria to be considered when assessing the extent to which a
corporation's cooperation will influence its decision as to whether or not
to bring an enforcement action against a company.' 5 Pursuant to the
report, a company would get "credit" for cooperation with law
enforcement authorities, "including providing the Commission staff with
all information relevant to the underlying violations." Provision of all
relevant information essentially required a full waiver of the privilege by
a company.
A. A Swing in the Pendulum?
Despite these assaults, and complaints by defense attorneys, few
lawyers objected to the government's coercive tactics until the
government's KPMG-related prosecution in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, United States v. Stein.'
6
The lack of objection was due less to agreement with the government's
tactics than to an understanding that non-waiver was too dangerous for a
corporation facing potential prosecution. Judge Lewis Kaplan's
momentous decisions in the Stein case seemed to precipitate a shift in the
government's attack on the privilege. Although Stein focused on other
aspects of the Thompson Memorandum's guidelines, such as the
relationship between a corporation and its employees, the decision
demonstrates that, although distinct, criticism was equally applicable to
13. Memorandum from Eric Holder Jr., supra note 9; Memorandum from Larry D.
Thompson, supra note 10.
14. See Memorandum from Eric Holder Jr., supra note 9.
15. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Divisions, SEC Act Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001).
16. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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the pressure put on companies geared at undermining the corporate
attorney-client privilege as well.1
7
In Stein, the government's practice of seeking corporate waiver of
attorney-client and work product protection came under fire as having a
chilling effect on attorney-client and employer-employee
communications.1 8 This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit.' 9
In Stein II, the court suppressed certain parts of the individual
defendants' statements, finding the statements had been "deliberately"
coerced by the government when it insisted that KPMG pressure
employees to grant government requests for pre-indictment interviews
without privilege protection or otherwise lose their right to have KPMG
pay their legal fees.20 Judge Kaplan's decisions helped to re-focus the
legal community on the issues surrounding the privilege and its
deterioration under pressure by DOJ.
An example of this renewed focus is the recent decision of a
California Court of Appeals in Regents of the University of California v.
Superior Court of San Diego County.21 In Regents, public and private
energy users brought an antitrust action against a group of energy
suppliers alleging that they unlawfully inflated the retail price of natural
gas in California between 1999 and 2002.22 Plaintiffs moved to compel
the production of privileged documents that the defendant corporations
previously had produced to federal investigators.23 The California Court
of Appeals considered whether disclosure of privileged communications
is free of coercion when, as a matter of policy, the federal government
advised corporations that they might avoid indictment or regulatory
sanctions if they fully cooperated with the government and waived the
attorney-client privilege.24
In finding that the prior coerced disclosures made by the defendant
corporations did not waive the privilege with respect to plaintiffs, the
Court wrote
[t]he means of coercion the government used here were, as a practical
matter, more powerful than a court order. A court order can be
challenged, without penalty, by way of extraordinary writ or appeal.
17. See generally id.
18. See id.
19. See United States v. Stein, 54 1 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
20. See United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp.2d 315, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
21. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
22. Id. at 186.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 188.
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In contrast here, the defendants here had no means of asserting the
privileges without incurring the severe consequences threatened by
the government agencies.
25
Other organizations also took steps to address the issues raised by
the Stein decisions. The Sentencing Commission voted unanimously to
reverse a November 2004 amendment to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines that had added commentary stating that an organization's
willingness to waive the privilege could be relevant to a determination
that the entity was cooperating with the government and therefore
eligible for a reduced penalty.26 The United States Senate Judiciary
Committee held hearings on the Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the
Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations during which notable
speakers including Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General,
Karen Mathis, president of the American Bar Association ("ABA"), and
private practitioners, charged the government with "overzealousness" in
investigation and prosecuting corporations resulting in the erosion of
constitutional rights.27 Around the same time, a bipartisan group of 11
former senior Justice Department officials wrote then-Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales to protest the government's application of the
Thompson Memorandum, seen as "seriously eroding" the attorney-client
privilege. 8
In response, on December 7, 2006, Senator Arlen Specter,
introduced legislation, written in conjunction with the ABA, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), Association of Corporate Counsel, and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. The purpose of the legislation, entitled the
Attorney-Client Protection Act of 2006 ("Act"), is to "place on each
agency clear and practical limits designed to preserve the attorney-client
privilege. 29 Specifically, the Act provides that in a federal investigation,
including criminal prosecutions or civil enforcement actions, an agent or
attorney of the United States shall not request that an organization waive
25. Id. at 194.
26. Angie Halim, Recent Sentencing Commission Amendment is Promising for
Corporate Organizations, THE WHITE COLLAR LITIG. NEWSL., Apr. 2006, at 1.
27. The Thompson Memorandum 's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006); see
also Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Preserving Your Job While Asserting the
Fifth Amendment, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 2006 (detailing testimony).
28. Jason McLure, Ex-DOJ Officials Blast Current Policy: Letter Signed by Bell,
Thornburgh, and Others Criticizes Approach Outlined In Thompson Memo, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at 18.
29. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 3013, 109th Cong. § 2(b)
(2006).
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its attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. 30  Furthermore,
under the proposed legislation, the government cannot condition any
charging decision or cooperation credit on the corporation's waiver or
non-waiver of privilege, the payment of employee's legal fees, the
continued employment of a person under investigation, or the signing of
a joint defense agreement. 31  The Act does not, however, limit a
corporation from voluntarily entering into a waiver agreement. 32  The
legislation is pending.33
B. Response by the Department of Justice
Five days after Senator Specter introduced his bill, in an apparent
attempt to demonstrate that such legislation was unnecessary, United
States Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty announced that the
DOJ was releasing revised corporate charging guidelines for federal
prosecutors throughout the country.34 The new memorandum, referred to
as the McNulty Memorandum, replaced the Thompson Memorandum in
its entirety.35 The McNulty Memorandum limited the circumstances
under which the DOJ could seek waiver in the typical case, adopting a
"tiered approach" to when prosecutors may request protected materials
from a business organization, distinguishing between documents
containing legal or non-factual advice versus those containing purely
factual information.36  Finally, the DOJ's revised guidelines also state
that prosecutors generally, cannot consider a corporation's advancement
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. On September 19, 2008, President Bush signed Senate Bill No. 2450 into law as
Public Law No. 110-322. This law creates a new rule of evidence-Federal Rule of
Evidence 502, or FRE 502-limiting certain attorney-client privilege and work product
waivers. The rule applies in "all proceedings commenced after" its enactment and,
"insofar as is just and practicable, in all proceedings pending" on that date. Its two major
purposes are to (1) harmonize the law governing certain disclosures of privileged and
protected communications, and (2) reduce litigation costs incurred in reviewing
documents for privilege before production. The new rule was proposed by an Advisory
Committee on Evidence to the Judicial Conference of the United States. When proposing
the new rule, the Advisory Committee specifically expressed concern about the
production of confidential or work product material by a corporation subject to
government investigation and the wavier implications of such disclosure.
34. See Ashish S. Joshi, An End to "Backseat Driving"? The Thompson
Memorandum and Government Tactics in White-Collar Crime Investigation and
Prosecution, MICH. Bus. L.J., Spring 2007, at 44.
35. See William M. Sullivan, Jr., The McNulty Memorandum: New DOJ Policies On
Attorney-Client Privilege And Attorney Work Product Protections, THE METROPOLITAN
CORP. CouNs., Feb. 2007, at 34.
36. See id.
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of attorneys' fees to employees when making a decision whether to
charge a corporation.37 The "rare exception" to this rule is when the
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the advancement of
attorneys' fees was intended to impede the government's investigation.38
Many observed, however, that the McNulty Memorandum did not
go far enough in eliminating the troubling provisions of the Thompson
Memorandum.39 Critics expressed concern that because the provisions
set forth in the McNulty Memorandum were only internal DOJ
guidelines, a corporation or employee had no recourse in the event that a
federal prosecutor failed to follow the guidelines.40  For this reason,
many legal organizations and professionals felt the Specter legislation
was a better option.4' The passage of the Act would create a means by
which businesses and their employees could seek judicial intervention in
the case of prosecutorial misconduct.42 As noted by one commentator,
under existing law, the DOJ can secure the claimed privileged materials
in court where the crime-fraud exception applies.43 The attempt by DOJ
to bypass judicial review in other cases was seen as an attempt by an
executive agency to legislate.44
In response to this continued opposition, the DOJ tried yet again to
appease the concerns of the legislature and the legal community. On
July 9, 2008, Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip sent a letter to the
Chair of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary outlining forthcoming
changes to the practices contained in the Thompson and McNulty
memoranda.45  Filip's letter stated that under the new revisions,
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Sullivan, supra note 35.
41. See, e.g., Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy from Former United States Attorneys
(June 20, 2008) available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/
files/letter to senator leahy-from former unitedstatesattorneys.pdf, Statement of
ABA President Karen J. Mathis regarding introduction in U.S. House of Representatives
of Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 (July 13, 2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cftn?releaseid= 151); NACDL
News Release, Defense Lawyers Bar Supports Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Bill
(July 12, 2007), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Newsreleases/2007mn017?
OpenDocument.
42. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 3013, 109th Cong.
(2006).
43. White Collar Crime Prof Blog, The McNulty Memo-Attorney-Client Privilege
Waivers & Attorney Fees (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
whitecollarcrime-blog/privileges/index.html.
44. Id.
45. Letter from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney General to Chairman Patrick J. Leahy
and the Honorable Arlen Specter (July 9, 2008).
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"cooperation will be measured by the extent to which a corporation
discloses relevant facts and evidence, not its waiver of privileges. 46 He
also offered that "federal prosecutors will not consider whether the
corporation has retained or sanctioned employees in evaluating
cooperation., 47 Senator Specter responded the following day, requesting
additional specific information from the DOJ, while opining that the
remedies as outlined in Filip's letter did not go far enough and that the
agency was not moving quickly enough. 48 Further, Specter stated that
even if the DOJ were to sufficiently address his concerns, legislation still
would be required because the revised guidelines would do nothing to
curb other federal agencies, such as the SEC and the Internal Revenue
Service, from engaging in the same abuses.4 9
On August 28, 2008, Filip published revisions to the Justice
Department's "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations."5 ° The Filip Memo shifts the focus from the disclosure of
privilege to the disclosure of "relevant facts." It provides, that an
assessment of a corporation's cooperation be based on the disclosure of
relevant facts concerning the alleged misconduct, rather than the waiver
of any privilege. Further, the Filip Memo prohibits prosecutors from
requesting waivers of "core" attorney-client communications or work
product or from crediting corporations that do waive privilege with
respect to this information. It states that prosecutors "should not ask for
such waivers and are directed not to do so." The Memo also provides
that "[c]ounsel for corporations who believe that prosecutors are
violating such guidance ... to raise their concerns with their supervisor,
including the appropriate United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney
General."
III. CRITICISM OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY
LEGAL COMMENTATORS
Beyond attacks on the privilege by the government attorneys, some
members of the academic legal community have argued for the abolition
of the corporate privilege. In Bellis v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Press Release, Arlen Specter, United States Senator, Specter Response Letter
to Deputy Attorney General (July 9, 2008).
49. See id.
50. See Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
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incrimination did not apply to corporations, limiting it to "its historic
function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records.,
51
Commentators have suggested that this rationale be extended to the
corporate attorney-client privilege.
The Supreme Court has reasoned that primary purpose of the
corporate attorney-client privilege is to "encourage full and frank
communications between attorneys and their clients, and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.,5 3 Critics of the application of the privilege to
fictitious entities believe that these purposes do not translate well to the
corporate context.54 First and foremost, they argue that the element of
secrecy, which is essential to any claim of privilege, is not possible in a
corporate entity, but only in a personal exchange between individuals. 55
"The human claim to confidentiality stems from 'human values and
human traits shared by members of every society.' Although
corporations are in many instances treated as fictitious persons, they are
not in fact persons, and the arguments made for personal confidentiality
cannot simply be transferred to corporate clients. 56
Commentators also argue that the benefits of the privilege,
including an increase in employee-attorney communications, are
marginal in the corporate context and last only as long as the employee
and the corporation's interests do not diverge.57 In fact, they argue that
because the privilege belongs only to the corporation, confidentiality is
an illusion for the individual employee. 58  Since "[t]he employee's
interest is protected only by the corporation's grace, not by the attorney-
client privilege," frank and full disclosure may not occur as often as
predicted as a result of privilege protection. 59
Moreover, critics argue that an overly-expansive view of the
privilege may interfere with the judicial system's truth-seeking
51. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974) (citing United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 701 (1974)).
52. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 188 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1988).
53. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
54. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D.
Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
55. See, e.g., id.
56. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 185 (1993).
57. See id. at 173-74.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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functions.60 This notion resounds in criticism that the application of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting imposes tremendous
costs on the judicial system. 61 One commentator has noted that "[b]y
encouraging client disclosure through secrecy guarantees, the state
protects clients who otherwise would jeopardize their case by
withholding information., 62 To obtain this information, their opponent
must spend extra money in the discovery process and courts must
adjudicate these disputes. Thus, the privilege shifts the cost of
potentially harmful information from the client withholding the
information to the party harmed by the non-disclosure and the system in
general.
For all of these reasons, some argue that the corporate attorney-
client privilege should be abolished, opining that attempts to restate the
privilege to address these points would be unsuccessful. 63  Taken in
conjunction with the assaults on the privilege by the government,
attorneys representing corporations correctly are wary of their ability to
maintain the confidences of their client. Further, the fact that privilege
law outside the United States is not as well-established as within the
United States threatens the stability of the attorney-client privilege in the
United States due to the increasingly international scope of corporate
practice.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE CORPORATE PRIVILEGE OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES
"At the beginning of the 21st Century, nearly every country in the
world recognizes some form of the attorney-client privilege," including
former communist countries and the People's Republic of China.64 In
addition, most countries also recognized the existence of some sort of
privilege or "professional secret" between a corporate entity and an
attorney. 65  Most foreign jurisdictions, however, do not recognize an
60. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 366 (1989).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Thornburg, supra note 56, at 220-r21. See also, LUBAN, supra note 52; Daniel R.
Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 33 (1998) (arguing that the
justifications for the privilege are flawed and the attorney-client privilege in total should
be abolished).
64. Joseph Pratt, The Parameters of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House
Counsel at the International Level: Protecting the Company 's Confidential Information,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 145, 159-60 (1999).
65. Mary C. Daly, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: The Role of the General
Counsel: Perspective: The Cultural, Ethical and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a
Global Organization: The Role of General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1086 (1997).
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attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel at all, and where it is
recognized, it is not absolute. These protections for corporations may be
less well-developed in other countries, in part, because of an absence of
perceived need for such protection by an artificial agency in light of a
traditional reluctance to hold corporate entities criminally liable; an
approach quite different from America's voracious appetite to prosecute
corporations for their employees' misdeeds. The less well-developed
privilege also may in part be a function of the fact that in some countries,
a lower expectation exists that broad discovery will be made available to
civil litigants.
A number of other policy reasons exist for the in-house counsel
variation outside the United States. First, some nationalities believe that
in-house counsel lack the independence required to provide privileged
legal advice. Foreign courts have focused on the issue of whether
independence is consistent with an in-house counsel employment
relationship, "leading to much debate over whether communications
between in-house counsel (even if legal in nature) are somehow
compromised or biased simply because of the employment relationship
of the 'client' it is advising.,
66
This unwillingness of foreign jurisdictions to include in-house
counsel within the umbrella of the corporate attorney-client privilege
also is due to the widely varying legal culture in foreign countries,
dictating a sharp distinction between in-house and outside counsel. In
part, this is the result of the different legal education and professional
training that exists in other countries. "Other than the United States, the
legal curriculum in most jurisdictions is part of an undergraduate study.
To be admitted to the bar in most countries, a supervised apprenticeship
and passage of at least one bar exam must follow this designated
undergraduate course work."
67
Law school graduates who choose not to pursue the apprenticeship,
still may serve as in-house counsel, negotiating and interpreting contracts
and advising on regulatory and liability issues. These individuals are not
necessarily members of the bar, however, and may not be recognized
within the legal profession. Further, in-house counsel are not necessarily
66. Lisa J. Savitt & Felicia Leborgne Nowels, Attorney-Client Privilege for In-
House Counsel is Not Absolute in Foreign Jurisdictions, THE METROPOLITAN CORP.
CoUNs., Oct. 2007, at 18.
67. Louise L. Hill, Disparate Positions on Confidentiality and Privilege Across
National Boundaries Create Danger and Uncertainty for In-House Counsel and Their
Clients, in BNA CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES: LEGAL ETHICS FOR IN-HOUSE CORPORATE
COUNSEL 2 (2008) (external page number citation provided by 2008 Thomson
Reuters/West).
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subject to the rules of ethics and professional discipline as are other
members of the bar.68
Because of this dichotomy, and the limited job opportunities open to
foreign in-house counsel, foreign courts likely are concerned not only
with in-house counsel's ability to maintain independence, but the
potential temptation of in-house counsel to hide corporate indiscretions.
Moreover, as in-house counsel often wears both a lawyer and a business
hat, these attorneys have been subject to criticism because their interests
mirror that of the commercial interests of their client/employer.
69
Those who believe that the privilege should apply to in-house
counsel counter that their ability and duty to independently counsel their
client is not hampered by the nature of their employment and that
application of the privilege would encourage full and frank
communications. For example, Carl Belding, counsel at IBM Europe
stated,
As matters stand, a lawyer who does a thorough job of analyzing the
facts and risks, so that he can better advise his business client, runs a
significant risk that his work will be used against his client. The
current policy, [which fails to extend the privilege to in-house
counsel], frustrates the lawyer's fundamental professional obligation
of counseling clients to comply with the law.
70
A. Examples of Foreign Application (or lack thereoj) of the Corporate
Privilege
In 1982, the European Court of Justice, a court overseeing matters
pertaining to the European Union, noted that while the attorney-client
privilege exists as a basic right, it was not available for communications
with in-house counsel since such an individual was unable to render
independent advice due to his employment by the corporation. 71 The
case before the Court was an antitrust investigation of an English
company by the European Commission. The company, AM&S, refused
to produce certain documents, which they believed to be protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The documents included legal memorandum
68. See Daly, supra note 65, at 1090-92; see also Roger J. Goebel, Professional
Qualification and Educational Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country:
Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TUL. L. REv. 443, 504 (1989).
69. Savitt & Nowels, supra note 66.
70. Josephine Carr, Should In-House Lawyers Have Lawyer/Client Privilege?, INT'L
Bus. LAW., Dec. 1996, at I.
71. Case No. 155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 2 C.M.L.R. 264 (1982).
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from the company's in-house counsel to certain employees. In addition
to finding that the documents were not privileged because in-house
counsel was incapable of rendering independent advice, the Court also
found that the privilege was only available to those lawyers governed by
the applicable professional rules, which excluded in-house attorneys.
72
More recently, the European Court of First Instance considered
whether to extend legal privilege to in-house counsel communications in
Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Ltd. and Akros Chemicals, Ltd. v. Commission of
the European Communities.73 As in the AM&S case, the European
Commission was investigating the anticompetitive practices of two
English companies. Azko claimed that certain documents seized by the
European Commission were privileged.
Although the President of the Court of First Instance acknowledged
that "confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and
client is an essential corollary to the full exercise of the rights of the
defence" and that "professional privilege is intimately linked to the
conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in the administration of
justice by the courts and as being required to provide, in full
independence, and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal
assistance as the client needs," the Court still declined to extend the
professional privilege to in-house lawyers.74 Rather, the Court found that
such attorneys could not provide independent legal services to the
company that employed them.75
Despite the European Union's position, specific countries within
Europe handle attorney-client privilege differently. For instance, the
United Kingdom affords in-house lawyers some protection, while in
France, in-house lawyers are neither members of the bar nor "avocats"
whose communications are afforded attorney-client protection.76 Under
German law, communications with in-house counsel may qualify for
privilege protection if the in-house attorney maintains separate offices to
which he has sole access and the general counsel acts in his capacity as
an attorney.77
These three countries essentially represent the three different ways
in which a foreign country may handle in-house counsel and the
attorney-client privilege. The privilege may be recognized, it may be
72. Id. at 1612.
73. Joined Cases T-125 & T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Ltd., Akcros
Chemicals Ltd. v Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-447 1.
74. Id. at 100-01.
75. See id.; see also Savitt & Nowels, supra note 66 (discussing the Akzo decision).
76. Savitt & Nowels, supra note 66.
77. Id.
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rejected, or, as in Germany, the privilege may be applied to in-house
counsel in qualified circumstances. In a survey compiled by a prominent
European law firm, only thirteen out of thirty-nine European countries
surveyed, or one-third, recognized the attorney-client privilege for in-
house counsel.78
The fact that the majority of European countries do not bestow on
in-house counsel the protections of attorney-client privilege should raise
red flags for American lawyers with international clients. Of particular
concern is whether American attorneys not licensed to practice in the
foreign country or before its bar similarly may, like their foreign
counterparts, not be able to assert the attorney-client privilege.79 Indeed,
in AM&S, the European Court of Justice stated as much. °  In
determining whether documents, including legal memorandum from a
company's in-house counsel, were protected by the attorney-client
privilege, the Court ruled that not only was the attorney-client privilege
inapplicable to in-house counsel, but also did not extend to any lawyer
not licensed by a "Member State."
' 1
V. WHY THE CORPORATE PRIVILEGE SHOULD BE PRESERVED
The corporate attorney client privilege, as established in the United
States, has been assaulted and criticized and is yet to be recognized
internationally. Despite this, the corporate privilege remains an integral
part of a judicial system which continues, rightly or wrongly, to expose
corporate entities to criminal liability. Given the significant
consequences such prosecutions have on innocent shareholders and
blameless employees, the benefits derived from the ability of attorneys
and corporate representatives to communicate with a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality outweighs the expediency of unbridled
disclosure. Recent efforts by Congress to strengthen the privilege,
78. See generally EVERSHEDS, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN EUROPE (2007),
available at http://www.eversheds.com/documents/AttorneyClientPrivilege.pdf; see also
Josephine Carr, Are Your International Communications Protected?, 14 No. 6 ACCA
Docket 32, Nov./Dec. 1996 (charting each country's application of the in-house counsel
privilege).
79. See, e.g., Richard E. Donovan, International Criminal Antitrust Investigations:
Practical Considerations for Defense Counsel, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 223 (1995)
(quoting Jonathan Barsade, The Effect of EC Regulations upon the Ability of U.S.
Lawyers to Establish Pan-European Practice, 28 INT'L LAW. 313, 323 (1994))
("[C]ommunications with United States attorneys will not be recognized as a protected
privileged communication, unless of course the United States attorney has attained the
status and credentials of a Member State lawyer.").
80. See Case No. 155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 2 C.M.L.R. 264 (1982).
81. Id. at 25.
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including the introduction of the Specter legislation, reveal this
recognition of the privilege's continuing significance.
Corporate criminal liability is a controversial subject within the
United States. Some critics argue that using the criminal justice system
to punish corporations obscures the moral content of criminal liability
because a corporation cannot have the requisite mens rea or guilt.
83
Others suggest that imposing criminal sanctions on a corporation actually
counteracts any deterrent effect because criminal sanctions frequently are
the least costly penalty a corporation could face for alleged
wrongdoing. 84 Along this vein, some assert that civil corporate liability
is a more efficient and economic response to corporate misconduct. 85 In
spite of these criticisms, corporations continue to face criminal sanctions
in the United States, which ironically is in essence the greatest threat to
the corporate attorney-client privilege, as corporations repeatedly and
freely waive in the hope of avoiding criminal liability.
A. Corporate Criminal Liability Here and Around the World
As early as 1909, in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Co. v. United States, the United States Supreme Court determined that a
corporation should be deemed to have the knowledge and purpose of its
agents because a corporation "can only act through its agents and
officers. 86 Since then, American courts have imputed liability to the
corporation, even where a single low-level employee acts contrary to
corporate policy or express instructions, and where the corporation has
made extensive efforts to ensure its employees' compliance with the
law.87
In contrast, with the exception of Great Britain, Western European
legal systems resisted the idea of corporate criminal liability until the
82. See, e.g., Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 3013, 109th
Cong. (2006); The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in
Corporate Investigations, supra note 27; White Collar Enforcement (Part 1): Attorney-
Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers: Hearing Before the H Judiciary Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2006).
83. See John Baker, Corporations Aren't Criminals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2003, at
A18; Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320
(1996).
84. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Crimes Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004).
85. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 83, at 321-322.
86. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95
(1909).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660-
61 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir.
1972).
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1970s. Before then, these nations followed the principal that a legal
entity could not be blameworthy: societas delinquere non potest.
88
Ultimately, "the increasing economic influence of corporations in
Western Europe and the unique threats posed to society from unregulated
corporate misconduct in such areas as consumer markets and the
environment," led many, but not all, of these nations to change their tune
with respect to imposing criminal liability on corporate entities.89
Despite some general agreement regarding the necessity for holding
corporations criminally liable, the degree to which particular acts
committed by individuals may be attributed to, and constitute crimes
committed by, a corporation continues to be treated differently across the
globe. Still today, some countries, such as Brazil, Bulgaria, Luxembourg
and the Slovak Republic, do not recognize any form of corporate
criminal liability. 90 Still, other countries impose only administrative
penalties on corporations whose employees commit criminal acts. These
countries, including Germany, Greece, Hungary, Mexico and Sweden, do
not hold the corporation liable under criminal statutes.91
A survey of those countries choosing to hold a corporate entity
criminally liable shows that a number of different approaches are taken.
The traditional approach examines the relationship between the
corporation and its employees, and has resulted in the creation of "a legal
fiction that the state of mind of employees and agents can be said to be
the state of mind of the corporate entity. 9  Courts in the United States
typically have taken this approach, holding that a corporation can be held
vicariously liable for the criminal acts of any of its employees when such
acts are taken within the scope of the employment and for the benefit of
the corporation.
In another variation of the traditional approach, courts in the United
Kingdom, Canada and other British Commonwealth nations have held
that a corporation is directly liable for wrongful conduct engaged in by
88. Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell
Us about American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 89,
105 (2004).
89. Id. at 108.
90. ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON, 'CORPORATE CULTURE' AS A BASIS FOR THE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS 9 (2008), available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf
[hereinafter Report for the U.N.] (report prepared for the United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Business); see also Eli
Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and
Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
641 (2000).
91. Report for the U.N., supra note 90.
92. Id. at 6.
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senior officers and employees, on the basis that the state of mind of the
senior employee was the state of mind of the corporation. 93 This theory
of liability has been referred to as the "identification model. 94  The
scope of identification model liability centers around the definition of
"senior" officers and employees.
More recently, some countries have adopted a new, more
enlightened basis for criminal liability which focuses on the "corporate
culture" and whether this culture directed, encouraged, tolerated or
somehow led to the commission of the crime by an employee or agent.95
This latter approach to corporate criminal liability has been termed
"organizational liability" and bases liability not on the acts of the
individual offenders, but on the corporation's policies, practices, or
management that permitted the crime to be committed. 96 In this model-
referred to by some as "arguably the most sophisticated model of
corporate criminal liability in the world," 97-a corporation is criminally
liable based on its corporate culture which permitted the wrongdoing to
occur. A model of such a system can be seen in Australia.
98
Although the tide of corporate criminal liability around the world
seems to be on the rise, it is clear that theories of liability are still
developing and in flux in most foreign countries. The opposite is true in
the United States, where criminal liability has been attributed to
corporations for almost a century. 99 Indeed, if the past ten years are any
indication, prosecutors and regulators are insatiable in their efforts to
prosecute and sanction corporate misconduct.100 The maintenance and
preservation of the corporate privilege in the United States is, therefore,
imperative.
VI. PRESERVATION OF THE CORPORATE PRIVILEGE
Preservation of the corporate attorney-client privilege, as it has been
developed in the United States, serves an important function. First, the
prosecutions of corporations have dire consequences for both the
companies and their innocent employees and shareholders. A notable
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 7-9.
96. Report for the U.N., supra note 90, at 7-9.
97. JONATHAN CLOUGH & CARMEL MULHERN, THE PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS
138 (2002).
98. Id. at s.12.3(2).
99. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95
(1909).
100. See Jodi Misher Peikin & James R. Stovall, Penance But No Absolution, ALM
Bus. CReMES BULL., Jan. 2007, at 1-2.
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example is the demise of Arthur Andersen after it was charged with a
single count of obstructing justice in connection with the government's
Enron investigation. Although the accounting firm's conviction
eventually was overturned by the United States Supreme Court in
2005,01 it had long since ceased doing business and all but 200 of its
almost 90,000 world-wide employees were out of a job.10 2 In addition,
the firm faced civil lawsuits from shareholders of companies that the
firm had audited.
10 3
In addition, the corporate privilege allows a corporation to maintain
the integrity of its business operations. The corporate privilege allows
corporations to monitor employee conduct and investigate potential
misconduct without fear that the fruits of their efforts will be used
against them criminally, administratively, or by civil plaintiffs. Clearly,
the inverse-that a corporation turns a blind eye to wrongdoing for fear it
will come back to haunt them-is unacceptable.
Regardless of one's position on the appropriateness of the corporate
attorney-client privilege, and whether it is on the wane, the privilege is
alive and well in the United States. Attorneys are guardians of that
privilege. In international investigations, certain challenges are posed to
American attorneys attempting to ensure that our clients' privilege is
honored here and abroad.
VII. MAINTAINING THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
From a practitioner's point of view, one aspect of furthering the
corporate privilege is taking the steps required to maintain the
confidentiality of a client's information, in all relevant jurisdictions.
When, as is increasingly common, white collar investigations cross
national boundaries, the sanctity of attorney-client communications,
particularly those involving foreign based in-house counsel, is not
guaranteed. To increase the odds of preserving the confidences and
secrets of corporate clients, 10 4 attorneys representing multi-national
clients, or involved in multi-jurisdictional document collection and
internal investigations, need to be alert to some basic rules that courts are
likely to employ when analyzing assertions of attorney-client privilege.
They likewise should be aware of the factors courts consider in deciding
101. See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
102. Jonathan D. Glater & Alexei Barrionuevo, Decision Rekindles Debate Over
Andersen Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at C1.
103. Id.
104. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1998).
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which country's privilege law applies in order to maintain the privilege
in all jurisdictions.
A. Cases Arising in United States Federal Courts
Little law exists that directly instructs on the rules for application of
the privilege in international investigation. In other contexts, however,
United States federal courts addressing the application of the attorney-
client privilege, in cases with international dimensions, seek to answer
two questions: first, whether foreign or domestic law applies to the
privilege question; and second whether, under the applicable law, the
privilege protects the communication in question. 1
05
To resolve the first question, in instances where the alleged
privileged communications took place in a foreign country or involved
foreign attorneys or proceedings, courts defer to the law of the country
that has the "'predominant' or 'the most direct and compelling interest'
in whether those communications should remain confidential."' 10 6 That
country may be the United States, or it may be the foreign country in
which the communications took place. This approach, known as a
"touching base" analysis, closely resembles a traditional choice-of-law
analysis. 0 7 Courts place the burden of persuasion on the party claiming
the application of the privilege. 
108
Courts engaging in the "touching base" analysis consider a number
of fact-specific factors. These include: i) whether the relevant
communications involved United States attorneys; ii) whether the client
was a United States resident attempting to protect a right under this
country's law; and iii) whether the relevant proceedings were in the
United States. 109
Most cases considering these questions have arisen in the context of
cross-border patent law cases. 10 Such litigation frequently involves
numerous foreign parties and laws which confer varying degrees of
confidentiality on communications with patent agents."' In one such
105. In re Rivastigimine Patent Litig., 239 F.R.D. 351, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
106. Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 92, 98 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (citing Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 522 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
107. Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 518-19.
108. Astra, 208 F.R.D. at 103.
109. Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 520.
110. See, e.g., Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. 514; In re Rivastigimine Patent Litig., 239
F.R.D. 351; Astra, 208 F.R.D. 92; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulence Rorer,
Inc., No. 95 CIV 8833 (RPP), 1998 WL 158958 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1998); Willemijn
Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429 (Del. 1989).
111. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 110.
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case, Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Company, the plaintiffs
refused to produce documents reflecting communications between
various foreign patent agents and an Italian corporation acting as agent
for the plaintiff corporation in seeking foreign patents.112 The plaintiffs
asserted that these communications were privileged, because the patent
agents were acting to assist an attorney in providing legal services:
namely, the application and procuring of patents. The defendants moved
to compel production of the documents.' 
13
A Magistrate Judge in the District Court in the Southern District of
New York noted that the crucial question was "whether an American
court may ever apply foreign privilege law to determine whether
communications with a patent agent should be protected and, if so, in
what circumstances."' 14 The Court noted that many foreign countries
treat patent agents as the functional equivalent of an attorney.' 1" 5 It then
engaged in a traditional choice-of-law "contacts" analysis. 116 Because
the documents in question reflected communications between an Italian
corporation and foreign patent agents, none of whom were a party to the
lawsuit, and were concerning patent applications in those foreign
countries, the Court found that the countries in which the patent agents
worked had the dominant interest in determining whether the
communications should be treated as confidential."17 As a matter of
comity, the Court looked to the law of those jurisdictions, ultimately
concurring with the plaintiff that the documents were protected by a
privilege not unlike the American version of the attorney-client
privilege.'8
In examining the law of Korea in another patent law case, Astra
Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court found that no
attorney-client privilege existed.1 9 Moreover, the court noted that none
of the documents at issue would be discoverable in a Korean civil suit
because the disclosure laws of Korea were notably narrower than those
that existed in the United States. 120 Indeed, in contrast to the United
States, many foreign countries have more limited discovery rules, which
112. Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 519-20.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 519.
115. Id. at 520.
116. Id.
117. Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. ac 519-20.
118. Id. at 521.
119. Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 92, 101-02
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
120. Id. at 102.
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serve to counterbalance the lack of privilege protection. 2 1 The court in
Astra opined,
Under these circumstances, where virtually no disclosure is
contemplated, it is hardly surprising that Korea has not developed a
substantive law relating to attorney-client privilege and work product
that is co-extensive with our own law. It also seems clear that to
apply Korean privilege law, or the lack thereof, in a vacuum-without
taking account of the very limited discovery provided in Korean civil
cases-would offend the very principles of comity that choice-of-law
rules were intended to protect. 
122
The court further found that ordering the disclosure of the
documents would offend the public policy of the United States forum,
which promotes full discovery, but allows for the protection of privileged
documents. 123 Holding that the application of foreign privilege law in
this case would result in the disclosure of documents that were both
protected under American law and not discoverable under Korean law,
the district court applied its own privilege law, even though the
communications did not "touch base" with the United States. 124 Because
the nature of the privilege varies so greatly in and among foreign
countries, the decision to apply the privilege law of foreign jurisdictions
likely will have significant impact.
B. Cases Arising Outside the United States
How foreign courts or tribunals will resolve the question of
privilege in cases involving international players is less clear. The policy
rationale underlying the non-application of the privilege to in-house
counsel leads one to believe that American attorneys will not have
privilege protection in those countries that do not extend the privilege to
in-house counsel.125 When the European Court of Justice ruled in AM&S
that the privilege was available only to those lawyers governed by the
121. Hill, supra note 67, at 2-3.
122. Astra, 208 F.R.D. at 102.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 520-23). But see In re Rivastigmine
Patent Litig., 237 F.R.D. 69, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing the court's refusal to extend
Astra to communications between Swiss in-house counsel and company employees-
"the absence of privilege results not from the lack of comparability of the Swiss and US
legal systems, but from the fact that Swiss law specifically excludes the documents at
issue from the privilege it recognizes").
125. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 79 (stating that "communications with U.S.
attorneys will not be recognized as a protected privileged communication, unless of
course the U.S. attorney has attained the status and credentials of a Member State lawyer"
(internal citations omitted)).
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applicable professional rules, the House of Delegates of the ABA
submitted a formal protest to Court expressing concern that the Court's
findings regarding in-house counsel and the privilege applied to all
lawyers outside the European Union. 126 The ABA believed that the
Court's decision meant that when an American lawyer represented a
client before the European Commission, client communications would
not be deemed privileged because American lawyers are not subject to
the European Union disciplinary rules and procedures. 127 As of today,
the ruling still stands, although "'debate about whether the rules ... are
outdated and should be changed' has been recently revived."
128
The exclusion of United States attorneys from privilege protection
in foreign countries is "unfair" according to one commentator, because
United States courts do not categorically exclude foreign attorneys from
enjoying the privilege. 129 Indeed, such disparity could be exploited by
United States authorities who might argue a waiver has occurred when a
document which would be recognized as privileged in the U.S, but is not
in a foreign jurisdiction, is produced in the foreign action.
C. Practical Suggestions for Ensuring a Clients' Privilege Interests are
Preserved
"Whether foreign law should play a role in defining the contours of
the attorney-client privilege in any given case is a determination within
the sound discretion of the court."' 30  That being said, based on the
instructive case law, steps exist that an American attorney can take to
ensure his client's communications are protected. First and foremost, the
likelihood that an American court will protect material involved in an
international investigation from disclosure can be increased through
reliance on connections to the United States. The involvement of in-
house and external lawyers from the United States is one way to ensure
that the documents "touch base" with the United States. In addition, to
the extent possible, retainer letters or documents defining the nature of
the attorney-client relationship should refer to potential investigations or
126. See Roger J. Goebel, Legal Practice Rights of Domestic and Foreign Lawyers in
the United States, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE
51, 76 n.140 (Mary C. Daly & Roger J. Goebel eds., 2004).
127. Id.
128. Hill, supra note 67, at 8 n.37 (citing Eric Gippini-Fournier, Legal Professional
Privilege in Competition Proceedings Before the European Commission: Beyond the
Cursory Glance, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 967, 968 (2005)).
129. Maurits Dolmans, Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel: A European
Proposal, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125, 129 (1998).
130. Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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litigation in the United States as one of the bases for undertaking the
representation. Moreover, where there is a less tenuous connection to the
United States, creating the possibility that a court will find that a foreign
government has a more compelling interest in the production or
preservation of the documents, attorneys always should evaluate whether
that jurisdiction's law circumvents American public policy.
